Richard L. Tieszen CV 2015

Curriculum Vitae

RICHARD L. TIESZEN

August 20, 2015

PUBLICATIONS:

Books:

After Gödel: Platonism and Rationalism in Mathematics and Logic, Oxford University Press, 2011. Paperbound edition 2013. (See quotations from reviews below.)

Phenomenology, Logic, and the Philosophy of Mathematics (PLPM), Cambridge University Press 2005.  Paperbound edition 2007.

Mathematical Intuition: Phenomenology and Mathematical Knowledge, Synthese  Library, Springer 1989. 

Books Edited:

Constructive Engagement of Analytic and Continental Approaches in Philosophy, co-edited with Bo Mou, Brill 2013, in Philosophy of History and Culture series.

Between Logic and Intuition: Essays in Honor of Charles Parsons, co-edited with Gila Sher, Cambridge University Press 2000.

Articles:

“Husserl on Kant, Logic and Mathematics”, forthcoming in a two volume collection on Kant’s philosophy of mathematics, edited by O. Rechter and C. Posy.

“Husserl and Gödel”, forthcoming in a volume on Husserl and logic, edited by S. Centrone.

“Leibniz, Husserl and Gödelian Monadology”, forthcoming in Gödelian Studies on the Max-Phil Notebooks, Volume 1,Presses Universitaires de Provence.

“Eidetic Results in Transcendental Phenomenology: Against Naturalization”.  Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, DOI 10.1007/s11097-015-9428-9

“Arithmetic, Mathematical Intuition and Evidence”. Inquiry 38(1) (2015), 28-56, in a special issue on mathematical evidence, edited by D. Føllesdal.

“Analytic and Continental Philosophy, Science, and Global Philosophy”, in Constructive Engagement of Analytic and Continental Approaches in Philosophy, B. Mou and R. Tieszen (eds.), Brill 2013, 103-124.  An earlier version appeared in Comparative Philosophy 2, 2 (2011), 4-22.  A Chinese translation appears in the journal Zhongwai Renwenjingshen Yanjiu 2012, 220-232.

“Monads and Mathematics: Gödel and Husserl”, Axiomathes 22(1) (2012), 31-52.

“Logic”, in S. Luft and S. Overgaard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Phenomenology, Routledge 2011, 439 – 448.

“Gödel’s Path from Hilbert and Carnap to Husserl”, K. Cramer and C. Beyer (eds.), Edmund Husserl 1859 – 2009. Neue Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, de Gruyter 2011, 147 – 163.

“Intentionality, Intuition, and Proof in Mathematics”, in G. Sommaruga (ed.), Foundational Theories of Classical and Constructive Mathematics, Springer 2011, 245 – 263.

“Poincaré on Intuition and Arithmetic: une ‘Saine Psychologie’?”, in P. Bour, M. Rebuschi, L. Rollet (eds.), Construction: Festschrift for Gerhard Heinzmann, College Publications 2010, 97 – 106.

“Mathematical Problem Solving and Ontology: An Exercise”, Axiomathes 20 (2010), 295 – 312.

“Mathematical Realism and Transcendental Phenomenological Idealism”, in M. Hartimo (ed.), Phenomenology and Mathematics, Springer 2010, 1 – 22.

“Elements of Gödel’s Turn to Transcendental Phenomenology”, Diálogos 91 (2008), 59 – 82.

“Husserl’s Concept of ‘Pure Logic'”, in V. Mayer (ed.), Edmund Husserl: Logische Untersuchungen, Akademie Verlag 2008, 9-26.

“The Intersection of Intuitionism (Brouwer) and Phenomenology (Husserl)”, in M. van Atten, P. Boldini, M. Bourdeau, and G. Heinzmann  (eds.), One Hundred Years of Intuitionism (1907-2007), Birkhäuser 2008, 78-95.

“After Gödel: Mechanism, Reason and Realism in the Philosophy of Mathematics”,  Philosophia Mathematica 14, 2 (2006), 229-254.  In a special issue on Kurt Gödel.

“Science as a Triumph of the Human Spirit and Science in Crisis”, in Continental Philosophy of Science, G. Gutting (ed.), Blackwell 2005, 93-112.  Reprinted in PLPM.

“Consciousness of Abstract Objects”, in Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Mind, D. Smith and A. Thomasson (eds.), Oxford University Press 2005.

“Parsons, Charles D.”, in The Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers,  J. Shook (ed.), Thoemmes Press 2005.

“Free Variation and the Intuition of Geometric Essences:  Some Reflections on Phenomenology and Modern Geometry”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXX, 1 (2005), 153-173.  Reprinted in PLPM.

“Husserl’s Logic”, in Handbook of the History of Logic, Vol. III. The Rise of Modern Logic: From Leibniz to Frege, D. Gabbay and J. Woods (eds.), Elsevier 2004, 207-321.

“Gödel and the Intuition of Concepts”, Synthese 133, 3 (2002), 363-391.  Reprinted in PLPM.

“Brouwer and Weyl: The Phenomenology and Mathematics of the Intuitive Continuum”, with D. van Dalen and M. van Atten.  Philosophia Mathematica 10, 2 (2002), 203-226.  In a special issue on Phenomenology and Mathematics.

“Intuitionism, Meaning Theory and Cognition”, History and Philosophy of Logic 21, 3 (2000), 179-194.  Reprinted in PLPM.

“The Philosophical Background of Weyl’s Mathematical Constructivism”, Philosophia Mathematica 3, 8 (2000), 274-301.  Reprinted in PLPM.

“Gödel and Quine on Meaning and Mathematics”, in Between Logic and Intuition: Essays in Honor of Charles Parsons, R. Tieszen and G. Sher (eds.), Cambridge University Press 2000, 232-254.  Reprinted in PLPM.

“Gödel’s Path from the Incompleteness Theorems (1931) to Phenomenology (1961)”,  Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 4, 2 (1998), 181-203.  Reprinted in PLPM.

“Mathematics, The Phenomenological Philosophy of”, in The Encyclopedia of Phenomenology, L. Embree et al (eds.), Kluwer 1997, 439-443.

“Science within Reason: Is There a Crisis of the Modern Sciences?”, in Analysis and Synthesis in Mathematics, M. Otte and M. Panza (eds.), Kluwer 1997, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 243-259.

“Logicism, Impredicativity, Formalism”, in Henri Poincaré: Science and Philosophy, J.L. Greffe, G. Heinzmann, K. Lorenz (eds.), Akademie Verlag and Albert Blanchard 1996, 399-415.  Reprinted in PLPM.

“Intuitionism”, in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement, D. Borchert (ed.), Macmillan 1996, 269-270.

“Mathematics”, in Cambridge Companion to Husserl, B. Smith and D. Smith (eds.), Cambridge University Press 1995, 438-462.  Reprinted in PLPM.

“Mathematical Realism and Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems”, Philosophia Mathematica 3, 2 (1994), 177-201.Reprinted with minor revisions in The Many Problems of Realism, P. Cortois (ed.), Tilburg University Press 1995, 217-246.

“What is the Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Mathematics?”, in Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science IX, D. Prawitz, B. Skyrms, D. Westerståhl (eds.), North-Holland 1994, 579-594.

“The Philosophy of Arithmetic: Frege and Husserl”, in Mind, Meaning and Mathematics, L. Haaparanta (ed.), Kluwer 1994, 85-112.  Reprinted in PLPM.

“Teaching Formal Logic as Logic Programming”, Teaching Philosophy 15, 4 (1992), 337-347.

“Kurt Gödel and Phenomenology”, Philosophy of Science 59, 2 (1992), 176-194. Reprinted in PLPM.

“What is a Proof?”, in Proof, Logic and Formalization , M. Detlefsen (ed.), Routledge 1992, 57-76.  Reprinted in PLPM.

“Frege and Husserl on Number”, Ratio 3, 2 (1990), 150-164.

“The Philosophy of Mathematics”, in The Telugu Encyclopedia of Philosophy and Religion (India), M.V. Sastry (ed.), Hyderabad: Vignana Sarvasva Kendram 1990, 421-429.

“Phenomenology and Mathematical Knowledge”, Synthese 75, 3  (1988), 373-403.Reprinted in Mathematical Objects and Mathematical Knowledge, M. Resnik (ed.), Dartmouth Publishing Company 1995, 373-403.

“Mathematical Intuition and Husserl’s Phenomenology”, Noûs l8,  3 (l984), 395-421. Hungarian translation in A matematika filozófiája a 21.század küszöbén, C. Ferenc (ed.), Osiris Kiadó 2003, 275-311.

Special Journal Issues:

“Gödel on Mathematics and Logic”, R. Tieszen (guest editor).  Special issue of Philosophia Mathematica, 14, 2 (2006).  Contributors: S. Feferman, W. Sieg, W.W. Tait, P. Koellner, R. Tieszen, M. van Atten. Awarded CELJ certificate for “Best Special Issue of 2006”.

“Phenomenology and Mathematics”, R. Tieszen (guest editor).  Special issue ofPhilosophia Mathematica, 10, 2 (2002).  Contributors:  D. Smith, P. Mancosu/T. Ryckman, M. van Atten/D. Van Dalen/R. Tieszen, D. Lohmar.

“Perspectives on Intuitionism”, R. Tieszen (guest editor).  Special issue of PhilosophiaMathematica 6, 2 (1998).  Contributors: M. Beeson, I. Moerdijk, G. Sundholm, A. Troelstra, D. van Dalen.

Review Articles:

“Against the Current: Selected Philosophical Papers, by Guillermo Rosado Haddock”, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, January 2013, http://ndpr.nd.edu

“Edmund Husserl. Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge: Lectures 1906/07“, Philosophia Mathematica 18, 2 (2010), 247 – 252.

Mystic, Geometer, and Intuitionist: The Life of L.E.J. Brouwer, Vol. 2, by D. van Dalen”,  Philosophia Mathematica 15, 1(2007), 111-116.

“Revisiting Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic”, Philosophia Mathematica 14, 1 (2006), 112-130.

On Brouwer, by Mark van Atten”, Philosophia Mathematica 1, 12 (2004), 75-78.

Mystic, Geometer, and Intuitionist: The Life of L.E.J. Brouwer, Vol. 1, by D. van Dalen”, Philosophia Mathematica 3, 8 (2000), 217-224.

“Gödel’s Philosophical Remarks on Logic and Mathematics: Critical Notice of Kurt Gödel: Collected Works, Vols. I, II, III”, Mind 107 (1998), 219-232.

Kurt Gödel: Unpublished Philosophical Essays, edited Francisco Rodriquez-Consuegra”, Annals of Science 54 (1997), 99-101.

Edmund Husserl: Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics, edited by Dallas Willard”, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 27, 3 (1996), 328-330.

Shadows of the Mind: A Search for the Missing Science of Consciousness, by Roger Penrose”, Philosophia Mathematica 4, 3 (1996), 281-290.  Reprinted in PLPM.

Mathematical Realism, by Penelope Maddy”, Philosophia Mathematica 3, 2 (1994), 69-81.  Reprinted in PLPM.

World’s Without Content: Against Formalism, by John O’Neill”, Husserl Studies 10, 3 (1994), 253-259.

Phenomenology and the Formal Sciences, T. Seebohm, D. Føllesdal, and J.N. Mohanty, (eds.)”, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 24, 3 (1993), 289-90.

The Origin of Geometry, by Jacques Derrida”, Isis 83, 3 (1992), 531-532.

Husserl, by David Bell”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52, 4 (1992), 1010-1013.

Phänomenologie der Mathematik, by Dieter Lohmar”, Husserl Studies 7, 3 (1990), 199-205.

Perspectives on Mind, J. Tuedio, and H. Otto (eds.)”, Husserl Studies 6, 2 (1989), 177-186.

WORK IN PROGRESS:

Books:

Phenomenology and the Exact Sciences.  A presentation and critical discussion of work in the phenomenological tradition on logic and the foundations of mathematics, including treatments of the work of Edmund Husserl, Gottlob Frege, Rudolf Carnap, Hermann Weyl, Oskar Becker, Felix Kaufmann, Dietrich Mahnke, and Kurt Gödel.  Implications of ideas in phenomenology for recent developments in logic and foundations are considered in some detail.

 Time: From Phenomenology to Physics.  A book on the philosophy of time, focusing on the gap between the phenomenology of internal time consciousness and positions on ‘objective’ time in physics.

Articles:

“Parsons on Intuition, Genetic Analysis, and Structuralism in Mathematics”

TEACHING APPOINTMENTS:

San José State University. Professor, 9/98-present. Associate Professor, 9/93-8/98. Assistant Professor, 9/89-8/93.  Associate Chair, 9/92-5/99, 8/05-5/09.

Visiting Positions

Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), Paris.  Directeur d’étude invité. Les théorèmes de Gödel, January 2009.

Archives Henri Poincaré/CNRS/Université Nancy 2. Chercheur scientifique, July – August 2007.

Institut d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences et des techniques (IHPST/CNRS), Paris. Chercheur scientifique, April – June 2007.

Universiteit Utrecht, The Netherlands, Autumn 2001.

Stanford University, Winter and Spring terms 1998.

Universiteit Utrecht, The Netherlands, Autumn 1994.

COURSES AND SEMINARS TAUGHT 

Courses

Introduction to Philosophy, Logic and Critical Reasoning, Mathematics and Logic for General Education, Moral Issues,  Computers and Cognition, Existentialism and Phenomenology, Intermediate Logic, Mathematical Logic I, II, Philosophy of Mind, Science, Technology, and Human Values, The Structure of Cognition: An Introduction to Husserl’s Phenomenology (Stanford)

Seminars

Kant’s Metaphysics and Epistemology (multiple times), Phenomenology (multiple times), Logic and Computation, Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems (multiple times), Intensional Logic, Intuitionism, The Mind and Infinity (twice in Utrecht), Phenomenology and Logic (Stanford).

SELECTED PRESENTATIONS:

“Phenomenology in the Western Tradition of Philosophy”, invited talk at Land of Medicine Buddha, Soquel, California, August 18, 2015

“Mathematics, Logic and Transcendental Philosophy: Kant and Husserl”, invited lecture at Intuition and Reason: International Conference on the Work of Charles Parsons, December 2013, Tel Aviv University and Hebrew University. Video available on YouTube.

“Rediscovering Consciousness in the West”, invited talk at Ocean of Compassion Buddhist Center, Campbell, California, February 2013.

“Monads and Mathematics: Gödel, Leibniz and Husserl”,  invited lecture at UC Berkeley Logic Colloquium, October 2013;  the conference Kurt Gödel, Philosopher: From Logic to Cosmology, Université Aix-Marseille, July 2013;  DagfinnFest, a conference at Stanford University honoring Dagfinn Føllesdal, October 2012;  Institut d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences et des techniques (IHPST/CNRS), Paris, November 2010.  Video talk at the conference “Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic”, Keio University, Tokyo, February 2014, to appear on YouTube.

“Science, Consciousness and Buddhism, Parts I and II”, invited talk at Ocean of Compassion Buddhist Center, Campbell, California, May and June 2012.

“Comments on Charles Parsons’ Mathematical Thought and Its Objects“, Author Meets Critics Session, American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, San Francisco, April 2010.

“The Place of Science in Analytic and Continental Philosophy”, in Symposium: Constructive Engagement of Analytic and Continental Approaches in Philosophy, April 2010.  Sponsored by the SJSU Center for Comparative Philosophy (CCP).

“Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Time”, in 10th Annual Philosophy Department Conference, San José State University, May 2010.

“Gödel: A New Kind of Platonism”, invited lecture presented at the Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), Paris, January 2009.

“Gödel on Hilbert, Carnap, and Husserl”, invited lecture presented at the symposium Edmund Husserl 1859-2009, Georg August Universität Göttingen, November 2009, the Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), Paris, January 2009, and at theEcole normale supérieure (ENS) Philosophy Department/Husserl Archives, Paris, January 2009.

“Elements of Gödel’s Turn to Husserlian Transcendental Phenomenology”, invited lecture presented at the Lichtenberg-Kolleg Göttingen, November 2009, in the Séminaire de philosophie et mathématiques, Ecole normale supérieure (ENS), Paris, January 2009, at the Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), Paris, January 2009, in the Semana de la Fenomenología, Universidad de Puerto Rico, October 2008, at the annual California Phenomenology Circle meeting, San Luis Obispo, April 2008, and at Stanford University, April 2009.

“Intentionality, Intuition, and Proof in Mathematics”, invited lecture presented in the Séminaire  philosophie des mathématiques, Recherches Epistémologiques et Historiques sur les Sciences Exact et les Institutions Scientifiques (REHSEIS/CNRS), Paris, January 2009, in the UC Berkeley Logic Colloquium, October 2007, at the Stanford CSLI Cognitive Science Lunch, October 2007, and in the seminar at Archives Henri Poincaré/ CNRS/ Université Nancy 2, July 2007.

“The Intersection of Intuitionism (Brouwer) and Phenomenology (Husserl)”, invited lecture presented at the conference “100 Years of Intuitionism”, Le Centre Culturel International de Cerisy la Salle, France, June 2007, and at the Institut d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences et des techniques (IHPST/CNRS), Paris, April 2007.

“Transcendental Phenomenological Idealism and Mathematical Realism”, invited lecture presented at the conference Phenomenology and Mathematics, Tampere, Finland, May 2007.

“Poincaré on Intuition and Arithmetic: une ‘Saine Psychologie’?”, invited lecture presented in the Séminaire de Philosophie et Mathématiques —  Poincaré: mathématiques, physique, philosophie, Ecole normale supérieure (ENS), April 2007.  Video available at the ENS Séminaire de Philosophie et Mathématiques website.

“Mechanical Decidability, Realism and Reason in the Writings of Kurt Gödel”, invited lecture presented at a colloquium on Kurt Gödel: les textes, Université Lille, France, May 2006.

“Einstein, Weyl, and Husserl”, invited talk presented at the American Philosophical Association Group Meeting on “Einstein Meets Husserl”, Portland, March 2006.

“Central Themes in Weyl’s Epistemology and Their Relation to Husserlian

Phenomenology”, invited lecture presented at Symposium on Herman Weyl as Epistemologist, Université de Provence, Aix-en-Provence, France, December 2005.

“Science as a Triumph of the Human Spirit and Science in Crisis:  Husserl and the Fortunes of Reason”, invited talk at a conference on Science and Continental Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, September 2002.

“The Technological Understanding of Being: Heidegger and Husserl”, Distinguished Professor Lecture, San José State University Philosophy Alumni Conference, April 2001.

“Technology, Danger and Reflection”, radio interview on KKUP, 91.5 FM, Cupertino, California, May 25, 2001.

“Intention and Fulfillment in Mathematics and Logic”, invited paper presented to the American Philosophical Association Group Meeting on “Logic and Consciousness”, San Francisco, March 2001;  University of Leuven, Belgium, October 2001.

“The Intuitive Continuum and the Revision of Logic”, invited talk presented at the SUNY-Buffalo Logic Symposium, March 2001.

“Gödel and the Intuition of Concepts”, invited paper presented to the History and Philosophy of Logic Working Group at UC-Berkeley, Spring 2000.  Also presented to the Logic Lunch group at Stanford, Spring 2000.

“Phenomenology and Intuitionism”, invited paper presented at a conference on Phenomenology and Mathematics, Universiteit Utrecht, The Netherlands, December 1999.

“The Philosophical Background of Weyl’s Mathematical Constructivism”, invited paper presented at a conference on Hermann Weyl: Mathematics, Physics and Philosophy, UC-Berkeley, April 1999.

“Gödelian Remarks on What Computers Can’t Do”, American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, Los Angeles, March 1998.

“Gödel and Quine on Meaning and Mathematics”. UC Berkeley Logic Colloquium, April 1996, and the Stanford Philosophy Colloquium, May 1996.

“Mathematical Realism and Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems”, invited talk at University of Oslo, Norway, December 1994; American Philosophical Association, Boston, December 1994; University of Leuven, Belgium, January 1995.

“Incompleteness and Anti-Mechanism,” invited talk at Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (CNR), Istituto di Cibernetica, Naples, Italy, November 1994.

“On Gödel’s Later Philosophical Views About Mathematics”, invited talk at Stockholm University, Sweden, October 1994.

“Logicism, Impredicativity, Formalism “. Invited plenary lecture, delivered at the International Congress Henri Poincaré, Nancy, France, May 1994.

“Incompleteness, Church’s Thesis, Minds and Machines”, American Philosophical Association, Los Angeles, April 1994.

“An Intuitionistic Theory of Meaning”.  Invited lecture, delivered at the Intuitionism and Meaning Theory Workshop, University of Leiden, The Netherlands, September 1992.

“What is the Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Mathematics?”  Invited lecture, delivered at the joint meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic and the Ninth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Uppsala, Sweden, August 1991.

“Teaching Formal Logic as Logic Programming”, Fifth International Conference on Computers and Philosophy, Stanford University, August 1990;  California State University AI Symposium, California Polytechnic State University, June 1990,.

“Frege and Husserl on Number”, American Philosophical Association, Central Division, Chicago, April 1989.

“Intuitionism with Intuition”, Association for Symbolic Logic,  Annual Meeting, UCLA, January 1989.

“Kurt Gödel and Phenomenology”, American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, December 1989; Association for Symbolic Logic, Chicago, April 1989; University of Iowa, January 1989.

Commentator, “Chaos Theory and Cognitive Science”, American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, San Francisco, 1993.

Commentator, “Vague Identity and Vague Objects”, Ohio Philosophical Association, Ohio Wesleyan University, April 1989.

EDUCATION:

Ph.D., Philosophy, Columbia University, 1986

M.A., Philosophy, Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research, 1978

B.A. with Honors, Philosophy, Colorado State University, 1975

SERVICE TO THE PROFESSION

Editorial Board Member, Philosophia Mathematica (Third Series), 10/91–present.

Advisory Board, Comparative Philosophy, 2010-present.

Scientific Board, Metodo: International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy, 2012-present.

National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH), Philosophy Fellowship Referee, July 2009, Washington D.C.

Project Member, Kurt Gödel: From Logic to Cosmology.  The goal of this multi-year project is to transcribe, edit and publish the unpublished philosophical notebooks (‘Max-Phil’) of Kurt Gödel, funded by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR), France.

Referee

American Philosophical Quarterly, Axiomathes, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Comparative Philosophy, History and Philosophy of Logic, Husserl Studies, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Journal of Symbolic Logic, The Monist, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic,  Noûs, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Philosophia Mathematical, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Studia Logica, Synthese.

AWARDS:

University President’s Scholar, 2007-08.  This is the highest award at San José State University in recognition of scholarly achievement, conferred annually on one faculty member.

National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) Fellowship, 2006-07 academic year.  Project: Phenomenology and the Exact Sciences.

Outstanding Research Award, College of Humanities and Arts, San José State University,2001-2002.

Dutch National Science Foundation (NWO) Fellowship, for six months of research o intuitionism and the philosophy of  mathematics, Universiteit Utrecht, The Netherlands, 1994-95. Sponsor: Dirk van Dalen.

Faculty Development Assigned Time Award, San José State University, 1990-91.

Meritorious Performance and Professional Promise Award, San José State University, 1989-90.

National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) Summer Seminar Fellowship, “Frege and the Philosophy of  Mathematics”, 1988.  Director: Michael Resnik

Quotations from reviews of 

After Gödel: Platonism and Rationalism in Mathematics and Logic

This aptly titled book is the most recent in a series of books and papers by Richard Tieszen devoted to reading Gödel’s key philosophical writings within the framework of Husserlian phenomenology.  The motivation here is Gödel’s late interest in, if not conversion to, Husserlian phenomenology, as witnessed by his 1961 (undelivered) lecture “The Modern Development of the Foundations of Mathematics in the Light of Philosophy”, as well as by his remarks in conversation recorded by various interlocutors, Hao Wang principal among them.  Both an enrichment and a fleshing out, this exploration of a philosophical road only partly taken by Gödel (as Tieszen readily admits) gives us Platonism construed phenomenologically.  Written by one of Husserl’s – and Gödel’s – most articulate and most knowledgeable interpreters, it is an important addition to the debate on issues of the ontology of mathematics.

For readers fluent in the language and literature of phenomenology (modulo disagreements on matters of interpretation that may very likely arise among specialists), the book delivers a careful and coherent “completion”, so to speak, of Gödel’s remarks on Husserl, in addition to the new view, constituted platonism.  On the other hand readers with little experience of phenomenology will also find Tieszen’s book valuable, giving as it does a brilliantly clear explanation of Husserlian phenomenology together with an application of it to the main philosophical problems (traditionally) associated with the mathematical enterprise.

Juliette Kennedy, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

The book also presents in a very readable way the main sources of Gödel’s speculations, in particular, Leibniz’ rationalism and Husserl’s phenomenology.  It has been clear for some years that Gödel did not hold the caricatured platonism that has often been attributed to him.  But Tieszen certainly gives the most extensive analysis of Gödel’s texts on the question of platonism and, in my eyes, definitely establishes the depth and qualifications of Gödel’s reflections upon the question of mathematical objectivity.  The time is over when Gödel’s name could be attached to the scarecrow of an unmitigated Platonism that one sets aside at the beginning of a paper.

Pierre Cassou-Noguès, History and Philosophy of Logic

… the book is a very interesting and stimulating text that achieves a rare and difficult task: it connects two traditions that have been separated and opposed for poor reasons and for too long, the analytical and continental tradition.  On the one hand, the author makes Husserl (and some of Husserl’s language) understandable to logicians and philosophers of mathematics; on the other hand it invites Husserl scholars to take into serious account the correlations to Gödel’s technical results, including the  incompleteness theorems and the remarks on Turing’s machines.  The accuracy of the quotations and the richness of textual references, together with the comparisons with other authors of the analytical tradition such as Quine and Carnap, do not only improve the clarity of the text, but will certainly stimulate a revival of studies of Gödel’s philosophy.  One of the main merits of the volume, from an historical perspective, is exactly that of telling us what Gödel’s philosophy cannot be, destroying a widespread but oversimplified understanding of his Platonism, and inviting readers to complete the framework by a thorough investigation of Gödel’s unpublished materials.

Paola Cantù, Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy

The book ends with very beautiful pages on the possibility of developing an account of our grasp of abstract objects “that is situated in a scientific setting” and provides further evidence against the claim that reason is present nowhere in the universe.

Frege is reported to have left a number of unpublished manuscripts and letters to his adopted son, Alfred Fuchs, with the words: “Even if all is not gold, there is gold in it nevertheless.”  The author thinks that much the same is true of Gödel’s Nachlass and is remarkably successful in defending his claim. After Gödel is very clearly and agreeably written. Hardly a sentence is de trop.  It convincingly develops a kind of platonic rationalism that combines aspects of transcendental phenomenology according to which there can be meaning clarification of basic abstract concepts of logic and mathematics.  It shows how the solution of at least some open problems in mathematics and logic might depend on the adoption of such a philosophical position.  Indeed, it opens a pursuable way to go forward after Gödel.

Stefania Centrone, Husserl Studies

Gödel held Husserl’s philosophy in high regard, and thought that it offered the most promising avenue for an adequate understanding of the foundations of mathematical thought and practice, but Gödel himself did not give a full systematic statement of how phenomenology might carry out that project.  Tieszen takes up the task in this book, which is structured around two main guiding themes.  The first is to locate the sources of Gödel’s philosophical views – principally in Plato, Leibniz, and of course Husserl, along with Kant as a sort of backcloth – and the second is to argue that from these materials, a promising rationalism in mathematics and logic can be consistently articulated.  Along the way we also encounter a good many of Gödel’s arguments against an array of reductive positions, Hilbert’s formalism and Carnap’s “logical syntax” project among them, as well as arguments against the prospects of a mechanical or purely computational understanding of the human mind.  Many of the arguments (both negative and positive) stem from reflection on the consequences of Gödel’s landmark incompleteness results of 1931.

Mark C.R. Smith, Journal of the History of Philosophy

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